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In many of today’s armed conflicts, such as in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, attacks against aid workers are a frequent, if 
still shocking, occurrence. While many in the international 
community condemn such violence, few can convincingly 
explain why it occurs against those carrying out 
humanitarian assistance (see Hammond 2008).
One explanation is that the distinction between 
combatants and aid workers has blurred as many soldiers 
are now charged with distributing relief supplies and 
undertaking reconstruction projects. Additionally, 
western powers are financing both military efforts and 
humanitarian assistance. Hence, aid workers are being 
perceived as agents of western imperialism instead of 
neutral humanitarians.
The solution, according to this logic, is to re-assert 
and clarify the humanitarian principles of neutrality, 
impartiality and independence in order to overcome this 
confusion, especially among those carrying out such 
attacks. But this Development Viewpoint argues that such 
an explanation misses the objective of such attacks. 
The attackers are not confused. They are trying to demonstrate their own 
prowess, the weakness of their victims and the inability of the opposing military 
force to protect them. They also reject the notion that the aid workers are 
independent. 
Aid workers have to also recognize that when they engage in relief and 
reconstruction, the nature of their work is inherently political.  Helping rebuild 
a state is a highly political act. Hence, stressing their neutrality is not likely to 
reduce the grave risks that they face. 
The Extent of the Attacks
Between 1997 and 2006, there were 408 incidents of violence against aid 
workers. And there were 941 victims and 434 deaths. The number of such 
incidents has been on the rise along with the number of aid workers operating 
in insecure environments. There has been a particularly sharp increase in the risk 
to national aid workers in comparison to their international colleagues.
What is noteworthy is that the number of politically motivated incidents 
has increased over 200 per cent. This has been due, in part, to a dangerous 
alignment (whether perceived or real) of the relief industry with western or 
northern political interests. ‘Militarized humanitarianism’, in which military forces 
often administer relief efforts (usually linked to counter-insurgency campaigns), 
is partly to blame.
Such relief initiatives are intended to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the local 
population as well as gain increased support back home for the military effort.  
Humanitarian agencies can often play an unwitting or unwilling role in such 
campaigns. In these contexts, humanitarianism can be used to mobilize popular 
support both in the conflict zone and in the global arena.
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Why the Attacks?
Humanitarianism is being attacked, not because it is weak 
or ineffective, but precisely because it is regarded as an 
effective threat. The violence is a ‘performative act’ designed 
to be noticed widely and to carry a powerful message. 
For example, in Iraq the murder of Margaret Hassan, the 
country director of CARE, and the bombing of the UN and 
ICRC headquarters garnered much more publicity for the 
perpetrators than attacking a convoy of soldiers or even a 
crowded market could have achieved.
Such attacks are meant to demonstrate that the opposition 
is more powerful than the western military machine 
portrays it. The attacks are also designed to attract those 
who are seeking a channel for their hatred against the 
‘western occupiers’.
In response to such attacks, some aid agencies have 
resorted to more ‘low-profile’ tactics. One such approach is 
to place greater reliance on local staff. But such staff members 
often face greater risks than their international counterparts. For instance, often 
they are not given security training and are not allowed to be evacuated if the 
security situation becomes precarious.
How to Respond
Aligning with local NGOs is another option that has more promise. For example, 
Islamist NGOs are often well received by the local population because they 
provide both material and spiritual support. Such an approach is likely to be 
more effective in bridging pervasive differences in cultures, lifestyles and beliefs 
between local communities and aid workers.
But the main criterion on which aid agencies are likely to be judged is whether 
they respond to the beneficiaries’ perceptions of their most basic needs. This often 
centres on the reduced access of the local population to essential resources. Those 
agencies that respond to such needs are more likely to be accorded trust and 
some measure of protection at the local level.
Such local acceptance of humanitarian efforts is no guarantee against violence, 
however. Often the local population is in no position to provide protection. Hence, 
there is no straightforward relationship between being accountable to the local 
population and reducing the risk of attack. 
What is essential for aid workers, however, is not to be lured into a false sense of 
security because they regard themselves as neutral actors, and to avoid, to the 
extent possible, being co-opted by more powerful forces with obvious political 
and military objectives.
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